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e-voting
electronic voting
Estonia i-Voting
System
Techniques · 20
Primitives · 68
e-voting
Deterministic simulation testing
distributed · medium: Run the whole system in one thread under a seeded scheduler with simulated network, disk and clock, so every failure replays from its seed.
›
Primary-backup replication
distributed · medium: One node orders all writes and ships them to standbys; the acknowledgement rule (none, one, all) sets what a crash loses, and an external arbiter decides who takes over.
›
Model checking and formal proof
embedded · medium: Exhaustively explore a model's reachable states (or prove its invariants with a solver or proof assistant) to find rule violations with a shortest counterexample trace.
›
Coverage-guided fuzzing
security · medium: Mutate inputs, run an instrumented target, and keep any input that reaches a new code edge; feedback turns blind guessing into incremental search.
›
Hardware security module (HSM)
security · medium: A tamper-resistant device or service that generates keys, signs, decrypts and wraps with them internally, and releases a key only as ciphertext.
›
Homomorphic encryption
security · medium: Additively homomorphic ElGamal/Paillier for encrypted tallies and private aggregation
Mix networks
security · medium: Verifiable re-encryption shuffles that unlink inputs from outputs
Merkle tree
data-structures · low: Hash tree for verifying and diffing large datasets with logarithmic proofs
Elliptic curve arithmetic
security · low: Point addition, doubling and constant-time scalar multiplication in projective coordinates
Shamir secret sharing (k-of-n)
security · low: Split a secret into n shares so any k reconstruct it and any k-1 reveal nothing at all, using a random polynomial over a finite field.
›
Sigma protocols
security · low: Schnorr and Chaum-Pedersen proofs of knowledge, OR-proofs for ballot validity
Cryptographic hashes (SHA-2, BLAKE3)
security · low: Collision-resistant fingerprints of data; SHA-256 for interoperability, BLAKE3 for speed, HMAC/HKDF for keyed uses.
›
X509 certificates
security · low: Certificate chains, path validation, SANs, revocation and short-lived issuance
Hdr histogram
data-structures · low: Log-linear bucketed histograms with bounded relative error for latency percentiles
Idempotency keys
finance · low: Client-chosen unique key per logical operation, stored with a request fingerprint and the final response, so retries replay the first result instead of acting twice.
›
Process supervision
hardware-os · low: A parent process starts services, reaps their exits and restarts them under a delay and burst-limit policy, then stops them with SIGTERM before SIGKILL.
›
ECDSA signatures
security · low: The elliptic-curve signature standardised in FIPS 186-5 (P-256) and used by secp256k1 ledgers; 64-byte signatures, but a repeated or biased nonce leaks the private key.
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Mutual TLS
security · low: TLS where the client also proves a certificate key, so every connection carries a verified, rotatable machine identity.
›
Graceful draining
systems · low: On a termination signal, stop taking new work, finish in-flight work until a deadline, tell clients to reconnect elsewhere, then exit; clients resume from a token.
›
Cooperative scheduling
concurrency · low: Green threads/coroutines yielding at await points on a user-space scheduler
Record replay
distributed · low: Record every nondeterministic input (time, randomness, I/O, model and tool outputs, per-tick player input) and re-execute deterministically for debugging, replays and state rebuild
PRNGs (PCG, xoshiro)
numerics · low: Small, fast, statistically strong non-cryptographic generators: PCG32 and xoshiro256**, with seeding, parallel streams and unbiased ranges.
›
Leases
distributed · low: A lock that expires on its own: bounded-time ownership that survives crashes and partitions, given bounded clock drift and fencing tokens on writes.
›
+ 13 more techniques
+ 52 more primitives
System
Techniques · 20
Primitives · 68
e-voting
Deterministic simulation testing
distributed · medium: Run the whole system in one thread under a seeded scheduler with simulated network, disk and clock, so every failure replays from its seed.
›
Primary-backup replication
distributed · medium: One node orders all writes and ships them to standbys; the acknowledgement rule (none, one, all) sets what a crash loses, and an external arbiter decides who takes over.
›
Model checking and formal proof
embedded · medium: Exhaustively explore a model's reachable states (or prove its invariants with a solver or proof assistant) to find rule violations with a shortest counterexample trace.
›
Coverage-guided fuzzing
security · medium: Mutate inputs, run an instrumented target, and keep any input that reaches a new code edge; feedback turns blind guessing into incremental search.
›
Hardware security module (HSM)
security · medium: A tamper-resistant device or service that generates keys, signs, decrypts and wraps with them internally, and releases a key only as ciphertext.
›
Homomorphic encryption
security · medium: Additively homomorphic ElGamal/Paillier for encrypted tallies and private aggregation
Mix networks
security · medium: Verifiable re-encryption shuffles that unlink inputs from outputs
Tamper-evident audit log
security · medium: An append-only log whose Merkle root, signed per batch, lets anyone verify an entry is present and history was never rewritten, with log-size proofs.
›
Threshold cryptography
security · medium: Distributed key generation and t-of-n threshold decryption or signing without a single key holder
TLS 1.3
security · medium: The standard encrypted, authenticated transport; one round trip, only forward-secret AEAD suites, and little left to misconfigure.
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Point-in-time recovery
storage · medium: Periodic base backups plus a continuously archived change log let you rebuild the state as of any instant, then branch from there.
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Delta debugging
compilers · medium: Ddmin minimization of failing inputs or change sets
Fault injection
distributed · medium: Inject latency, errors, kills and partitions via proxies, netem or hooks
CDCL SAT solving
optimization · medium: Search for a satisfying assignment, learn a new constraint from every dead end, and jump back past irrelevant choices; handles industrial formulas with millions of clauses.
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Dpll t
optimization · medium: SMT architecture: CDCL over boolean abstraction plus theory solvers, theory propagation, Nelson-Oppen
ARIES recovery
storage · medium: Three-pass crash recovery (analysis, redo, undo) for steal/no-force buffer pools; repeats history, then rolls back losers with compensation log records.
›
Congruence closure
compilers · medium: Union-find over terms with congruence propagation; decides equality with uninterpreted functions
Bit blasting
optimization · medium: Reduce bit-vector constraints to CNF via adder, multiplier and comparator circuits
Syscall interception
security · medium: Intercept syscalls via ptrace, seccomp user notify or a user-space kernel
Buffer pool
storage · medium: The database's own page cache (frames, page table, pin counts, dirty bits, replacement) so it, not the OS, controls eviction, write order and I/O.
›
Merkle tree
data-structures · low: Hash tree for verifying and diffing large datasets with logarithmic proofs
Elliptic curve arithmetic
security · low: Point addition, doubling and constant-time scalar multiplication in projective coordinates
Shamir secret sharing (k-of-n)
security · low: Split a secret into n shares so any k reconstruct it and any k-1 reveal nothing at all, using a random polynomial over a finite field.
›
Sigma protocols
security · low: Schnorr and Chaum-Pedersen proofs of knowledge, OR-proofs for ballot validity
Cryptographic hashes (SHA-2, BLAKE3)
security · low: Collision-resistant fingerprints of data; SHA-256 for interoperability, BLAKE3 for speed, HMAC/HKDF for keyed uses.
›
X509 certificates
security · low: Certificate chains, path validation, SANs, revocation and short-lived issuance
Hdr histogram
data-structures · low: Log-linear bucketed histograms with bounded relative error for latency percentiles
Idempotency keys
finance · low: Client-chosen unique key per logical operation, stored with a request fingerprint and the final response, so retries replay the first result instead of acting twice.
›
Process supervision
hardware-os · low: A parent process starts services, reaps their exits and restarts them under a delay and burst-limit policy, then stops them with SIGTERM before SIGKILL.
›
ECDSA signatures
security · low: The elliptic-curve signature standardised in FIPS 186-5 (P-256) and used by secp256k1 ledgers; 64-byte signatures, but a repeated or biased nonce leaks the private key.
›
Mutual TLS
security · low: TLS where the client also proves a certificate key, so every connection carries a verified, rotatable machine identity.
›
Graceful draining
systems · low: On a termination signal, stop taking new work, finish in-flight work until a deadline, tell clients to reconnect elsewhere, then exit; clients resume from a token.
›
Cooperative scheduling
concurrency · low: Green threads/coroutines yielding at await points on a user-space scheduler
Record replay
distributed · low: Record every nondeterministic input (time, randomness, I/O, model and tool outputs, per-tick player input) and re-execute deterministically for debugging, replays and state rebuild
PRNGs (PCG, xoshiro)
numerics · low: Small, fast, statistically strong non-cryptographic generators: PCG32 and xoshiro256**, with seeding, parallel streams and unbiased ranges.
›
Leases
distributed · low: A lock that expires on its own: bounded-time ownership that survives crashes and partitions, given bounded clock drift and fencing tokens on writes.
›
Write-ahead log
storage · low: Append each change to a checksummed sequential log and fsync it before touching data pages; the basis of crash durability in nearly every database.
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Health checking
systems · low: Decide per backend whether to route to it using probes and real-traffic errors, with consecutive-count hysteresis, capped ejection and a panic fallback.
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Swiss table
data-structures · low: Open-addressing hash table that filters 8-16 slots at once with 1-byte hash tags and SIMD, giving fast lookups at 87.5 % load.
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BFS and DFS
graphs · low: The two basic graph traversals; BFS gives hop distances and levels, DFS gives discovery/finish order for cycles, components and topological order.
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Binary decision diagrams
optimization · low: A reduced ordered BDD stores a Boolean function as a shared DAG that is unique per variable order, so equivalence is one integer compare and counting is one pass.
›
Code coverage instrumentation
compilers · low: Insert counters into compiled code to record which blocks, edges or lines ran; a spanning tree of the control-flow graph cuts the counters needed.
›
Fast hash functions
data-structures · low: Non-cryptographic hashes built from 64×64→128-bit multiplies and xor-shifts; pick by key size, trust level and whether the hash is persisted.
›
Sanitizers
security · low: ASan/UBSan/TSan shadow memory and instrumentation to catch memory bugs
Aes key wrap
security · low: AES Key Wrap (RFC 3394/5649) and AES-GCM-SIV for deterministic, authenticated wrapping of key material
Csprng
security · low: OS-backed cryptographically secure random numbers (getrandom), and when a fast PRNG is not enough
Dual control approval
security · low: Four-eyes / maker-checker approval with quorum policies for sensitive operations
Secure memory zeroization
security · low: Keep secrets in one locked, fixed-size, non-copyable region, erase them with writes the compiler must keep, and exclude them from dumps and swap.
›
Big integer arithmetic
numerics · low: Multi-limb integer arithmetic (256-bit and up): carries, Karatsuba, Montgomery and Barrett reduction
Finite field arithmetic
numerics · low: Prime-field and extension-field arithmetic (Montgomery form, Goldilocks, BabyBear), vectorized
Number theoretic transform
numerics · low: FFT over finite fields for exact polynomial and big-integer multiplication
AEAD (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305)
security · low: Authenticated encryption that encrypts and detects tampering in one call; the only kind of symmetric encryption you should use.
›
ECDH key exchange (X25519, P-256)
security · low: Each side multiplies the other's public curve point by its own scalar and both get the same point; always validate the peer key and run the result through a KDF.
›
Traffic padding
security · low: Padding and timing obfuscation against traffic analysis and website fingerprinting
Segmented log
distributed · low: Split an append-only log into files named by their first offset, write only the newest, and find any record by binary search plus a sparse index.
›
Digital signatures (Ed25519)
security · low: Small, fast, deterministic public-key signatures that prove who produced a message; the default for tokens, releases and protocols.
›
Trusted timestamping
security · low: RFC 3161 time-stamp tokens: a TSA signs a hash with time, proving data existed then
Commitment schemes
security · low: Hash and Pedersen commitments: hide a value now, bind to it, reveal later
HKDF key derivation (extract-and-ex…
security · low: HMAC-based two-step key derivation: extract a uniform pseudorandom key from any secret, then expand it into as many context-bound keys as you need.
›
Object storage
cloud · low: S3-compatible blob storage at cents per GB-month with 11 nines durability; pick by egress price, request price and latency, not by storage price alone.
›
Copy on write snapshots
storage · low: Point-in-time snapshots by sharing pages/extents and copying only on write
Failure bisection
search-sort · low: Binary search over commits, batches or inputs to isolate a failure
Transparent interception
networking · low: Redirect traffic to a local proxy (iptables TPROXY/REDIRECT, eBPF) without app changes
d-ary heap
data-structures · low: Array heap with d children per node (d = 4 typical): half the binary heap's depth, siblings in one cache line, faster priority queues.
›
Drat proof certificates
optimization · low: DRAT and LRAT proofs emitted by SAT solvers and checked independently
Two watched literals
optimization · low: Unit propagation for SAT that watches just two literals per clause, so backtracking costs nothing and long clauses are rarely touched.
›
Arena allocator
systems · low: Allocate by bumping a pointer through big chunks and free everything at once: a few instructions per allocation for objects sharing a lifetime.
›
Simplex method
optimization · low: Solves linear programs by walking along the edges of the feasible polytope from vertex to vertex, one basis swap (pivot) at a time; the workhorse behind MIP solvers.
›
Hash consing
data-structures · low: Intern structurally equal immutable terms so equality is pointer comparison and sharing is maximal
Union-find
graphs · low: Disjoint-set forest with union by size and path compression; merges sets and answers same-set queries in effectively constant time.
›
Arithmetic circuits
hardware-os · low: Adder and multiplier circuits: carry-lookahead, prefix adders, Booth encoding, Wallace and Dadda trees
Tseitin transformation
optimization · low: Linear-size CNF encoding of formulas with auxiliary variables
Ebpf
hardware-os · low: Verified in-kernel programs on hooks (kprobes, XDP, tc) with maps
Ptrace process control
hardware-os · low: Ptrace: attach, read and write registers and memory, single-step, intercept signals
Seccomp bpf
security · low: Syscall filtering with seccomp BPF programs
fsync, O_DSYNC and O_DIRECT
hardware-os · low: What fsync, fdatasync, O_DSYNC, O_DIRECT and F_FULLFSYNC really guarantee on Linux and macOS, and the exact call sequences for crash-safe files.
›
LRU and CLOCK
systems · low: LRU evicts the least recently used entry via hash map plus linked list; CLOCK approximates it with a reference bit, so hits take no lock.
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S3-FIFO
systems · low: Three FIFO queues (small, main, ghost) that evict one-hit wonders quickly and keep reused objects; low miss ratios with no list moves on hits.
›
Control-flow graph
compilers · low: Split a linear instruction list into basic blocks and connect them by jumps; the graph every optimizer, SSA builder and dataflow pass walks.
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Fencing tokens
distributed · low: A number that grows with every lock grant and is checked by the protected resource, so a paused ex-holder's late write is rejected.
›
Minimum spanning tree
graphs · low: Cheapest set of edges connecting all vertices; Kruskal sorts edges and joins components with union-find, Prim grows one tree, Boruvka merges in parallel rounds.
›
CRC32C checksums
hardware-os · low: The Castagnoli CRC-32 with dedicated instructions on x86 (SSE4.2) and ARMv8. It is the standard fast integrity check for storage blocks, logs and network frames.
›
SIMD programming
hardware-os · low: Process 4-16 lanes per instruction with AVX2, AVX-512 or NEON via Rust std::arch, with runtime dispatch and a portable fallback.
›
Floating-point error
numerics · low: How IEEE 754 rounding error accumulates and how to contain it: compensated (Kahan/Neumaier) and pairwise summation, error-free transformations with FMA, ULP comparisons.
›
LU and Cholesky factorization
numerics · low: Factor A = PLU (any square matrix, partial pivoting) or A = LLᵀ (SPD) once in O(n³), then solve each right-hand side in O(n²).
›
Sparse matrices (CSR)
numerics · low: Compressed sparse row stores only nonzeros as row pointers, column indices and values; SpMV streams them once, so it is memory-bandwidth bound.
›
Constant time code
security · low: Writing secret-dependent code without branches or memory lookups on secrets; constant-time compare and select
Exponential backoff with jitter
systems · low: Retry after delays that grow geometrically and are randomized, so failed clients spread out instead of hammering a recovering service in synchronized waves.
›
Copy for AI
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