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System
Techniques · 20
Primitives · 66
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Deterministic simulation testing
distributed · medium: Run the whole system in one thread under a seeded scheduler with simulated network, disk and clock, so every failure replays from its seed.
›
Durable workflow execution
distributed · medium: Ordinary code made crash-proof by logging every side-effect result and replaying the code from that log; activities run at least once, workflow logic must be deterministic.
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Primary-backup replication
distributed · medium: One node orders all writes and ships them to standbys; the acknowledgement rule (none, one, all) sets what a crash loses, and an external arbiter decides who takes over.
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Email delivery smtp
networking · medium: Outbound SMTP: queues, MX lookup, retries, bounces, feedback loops and IP warm-up
Coverage-guided fuzzing
security · medium: Mutate inputs, run an instrumented target, and keep any input that reaches a new code edge; feedback turns blind guessing into incremental search.
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Envelope encryption
security · medium: Encrypt each object with its own data key and wrap that key under a KMS-held key, so rotation re-wraps 60 bytes and deleting a key shreds data.
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Hardware security module (HSM)
security · medium: A tamper-resistant device or service that generates keys, signs, decrypts and wraps with them internally, and releases a key only as ciphertext.
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Csprng
security · low: OS-backed cryptographically secure random numbers (getrandom), and when a fast PRNG is not enough
Cryptographic hashes (SHA-2, BLAKE3)
security · low: Collision-resistant fingerprints of data; SHA-256 for interoperability, BLAKE3 for speed, HMAC/HKDF for keyed uses.
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Trusted timestamping
security · low: RFC 3161 time-stamp tokens: a TSA signs a hash with time, proving data existed then
X509 certificates
security · low: Certificate chains, path validation, SANs, revocation and short-lived issuance
Pdf object model parsing
storage · low: PDF xref tables, object streams, content stream operators and incremental updates
Merkle tree
data-structures · low: Hash tree for verifying and diffing large datasets with logarithmic proofs
Digital signatures (Ed25519)
security · low: Small, fast, deterministic public-key signatures that prove who produced a message; the default for tokens, releases and protocols.
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Hdr histogram
data-structures · low: Log-linear bucketed histograms with bounded relative error for latency percentiles
Process supervision
hardware-os · low: A parent process starts services, reaps their exits and restarts them under a delay and burst-limit policy, then stops them with SIGTERM before SIGKILL.
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Mutual TLS
security · low: TLS where the client also proves a certificate key, so every connection carries a verified, rotatable machine identity.
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Graceful draining
systems · low: On a termination signal, stop taking new work, finish in-flight work until a deadline, tell clients to reconnect elsewhere, then exit; clients resume from a token.
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Cooperative scheduling
concurrency · low: Green threads/coroutines yielding at await points on a user-space scheduler
Record replay
distributed · low: Record every nondeterministic input (time, randomness, I/O, model and tool outputs, per-tick player input) and re-execute deterministically for debugging, replays and state rebuild
PRNGs (PCG, xoshiro)
numerics · low: Small, fast, statistically strong non-cryptographic generators: PCG32 and xoshiro256**, with seeding, parallel streams and unbiased ranges.
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Event sourcing
finance · low: Persist state changes as an append-only stream of immutable events per entity; current state is a fold over them, guarded by expected-version appends.
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Hierarchical timing wheel
systems · low: Timers bucketed by expiry into wheels of slots, coarser wheels for far deadlines: O(1) insert and cancel for millions of timeouts.
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+ 13 more techniques
+ 50 more primitives
System
Techniques · 20
Primitives · 66
e-signature
Deterministic simulation testing
distributed · medium: Run the whole system in one thread under a seeded scheduler with simulated network, disk and clock, so every failure replays from its seed.
›
Durable workflow execution
distributed · medium: Ordinary code made crash-proof by logging every side-effect result and replaying the code from that log; activities run at least once, workflow logic must be deterministic.
›
Primary-backup replication
distributed · medium: One node orders all writes and ships them to standbys; the acknowledgement rule (none, one, all) sets what a crash loses, and an external arbiter decides who takes over.
›
Email delivery smtp
networking · medium: Outbound SMTP: queues, MX lookup, retries, bounces, feedback loops and IP warm-up
Coverage-guided fuzzing
security · medium: Mutate inputs, run an instrumented target, and keep any input that reaches a new code edge; feedback turns blind guessing into incremental search.
›
Envelope encryption
security · medium: Encrypt each object with its own data key and wrap that key under a KMS-held key, so rotation re-wraps 60 bytes and deleting a key shreds data.
›
Hardware security module (HSM)
security · medium: A tamper-resistant device or service that generates keys, signs, decrypts and wraps with them internally, and releases a key only as ciphertext.
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Mfa
security · medium: Multi-factor authentication flows: TOTP, push, WebAuthn second factor, recovery codes, step-up
Pdf digital signatures
security · medium: CMS/PAdES signatures embedded in PDFs with byte ranges and long-term validation
Tamper-evident audit log
security · medium: An append-only log whose Merkle root, signed per batch, lets anyone verify an entry is present and history was never rewritten, with log-size proofs.
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Point-in-time recovery
storage · medium: Periodic base backups plus a continuously archived change log let you rebuild the state as of any instant, then branch from there.
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Delta debugging
compilers · medium: Ddmin minimization of failing inputs or change sets
Durable job queue
distributed · medium: Persisted tasks that workers lease for a visibility timeout, ack on success and retry with backoff; at-least-once execution that survives worker and queue crashes.
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Fault injection
distributed · medium: Inject latency, errors, kills and partitions via proxies, netem or hooks
Bounce processing
networking · medium: Parse DSNs and feedback loops, classify hard/soft bounces, maintain suppression lists
TLS 1.3
security · medium: The standard encrypted, authenticated transport; one round trip, only forward-secret AEAD suites, and little left to misconfigure.
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ARIES recovery
storage · medium: Three-pass crash recovery (analysis, redo, undo) for steal/no-force buffer pools; repeats history, then rolls back losers with compensation log records.
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Linear-time regular expression matc…
search-sort · medium: Match a regular expression in O(pattern x text) worst case by tracking all live parse positions at once, then cache the state sets as a lazily built DFA for speed.
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Syscall interception
security · medium: Intercept syscalls via ptrace, seccomp user notify or a user-space kernel
Buffer pool
storage · medium: The database's own page cache (frames, page table, pin counts, dirty bits, replacement) so it, not the OS, controls eviction, write order and I/O.
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Csprng
security · low: OS-backed cryptographically secure random numbers (getrandom), and when a fast PRNG is not enough
Cryptographic hashes (SHA-2, BLAKE3)
security · low: Collision-resistant fingerprints of data; SHA-256 for interoperability, BLAKE3 for speed, HMAC/HKDF for keyed uses.
›
Trusted timestamping
security · low: RFC 3161 time-stamp tokens: a TSA signs a hash with time, proving data existed then
X509 certificates
security · low: Certificate chains, path validation, SANs, revocation and short-lived issuance
Pdf object model parsing
storage · low: PDF xref tables, object streams, content stream operators and incremental updates
Merkle tree
data-structures · low: Hash tree for verifying and diffing large datasets with logarithmic proofs
Digital signatures (Ed25519)
security · low: Small, fast, deterministic public-key signatures that prove who produced a message; the default for tokens, releases and protocols.
›
Hdr histogram
data-structures · low: Log-linear bucketed histograms with bounded relative error for latency percentiles
Process supervision
hardware-os · low: A parent process starts services, reaps their exits and restarts them under a delay and burst-limit policy, then stops them with SIGTERM before SIGKILL.
›
Mutual TLS
security · low: TLS where the client also proves a certificate key, so every connection carries a verified, rotatable machine identity.
›
Graceful draining
systems · low: On a termination signal, stop taking new work, finish in-flight work until a deadline, tell clients to reconnect elsewhere, then exit; clients resume from a token.
›
Cooperative scheduling
concurrency · low: Green threads/coroutines yielding at await points on a user-space scheduler
Record replay
distributed · low: Record every nondeterministic input (time, randomness, I/O, model and tool outputs, per-tick player input) and re-execute deterministically for debugging, replays and state rebuild
PRNGs (PCG, xoshiro)
numerics · low: Small, fast, statistically strong non-cryptographic generators: PCG32 and xoshiro256**, with seeding, parallel streams and unbiased ranges.
›
Event sourcing
finance · low: Persist state changes as an append-only stream of immutable events per entity; current state is a fold over them, guarded by expected-version appends.
›
Hierarchical timing wheel
systems · low: Timers bucketed by expiry into wheels of slots, coarser wheels for far deadlines: O(1) insert and cancel for millions of timeouts.
›
Leases
distributed · low: A lock that expires on its own: bounded-time ownership that survives crashes and partitions, given bounded clock drift and fencing tokens on writes.
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Write-ahead log
storage · low: Append each change to a checksummed sequential log and fsync it before touching data pages; the basis of crash durability in nearly every database.
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Health checking
systems · low: Decide per backend whether to route to it using probes and real-traffic errors, with consecutive-count hysteresis, capped ejection and a panic fallback.
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SPF, DKIM and DMARC sender authenti…
networking · low: SPF authorizes sending IPs, DKIM signs the message, DMARC requires either to match the visible From domain and says what to do on failure.
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DNS message format and client looku…
networking · low: Binary query/response format of DNS (RFC 1035) and how a stub client uses it: record types, name compression, UDP/TCP/EDNS sizes, TTL caching.
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Smtp protocol
networking · low: SMTP/ESMTP sessions, pipelining, STARTTLS and reply codes
Exponential backoff with jitter
systems · low: Retry after delays that grow geometrically and are randomized, so failed clients spread out instead of hammering a recovering service in synchronized waves.
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Token bucket
systems · low: A bucket of up to b tokens refilled at rate r; requests spend tokens, enforcing an average rate while allowing bursts of b.
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Code coverage instrumentation
compilers · low: Insert counters into compiled code to record which blocks, edges or lines ran; a spanning tree of the control-flow graph cuts the counters needed.
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Fast hash functions
data-structures · low: Non-cryptographic hashes built from 64×64→128-bit multiplies and xor-shifts; pick by key size, trust level and whether the hash is persisted.
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Sanitizers
security · low: ASan/UBSan/TSan shadow memory and instrumentation to catch memory bugs
AEAD (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305)
security · low: Authenticated encryption that encrypts and detects tampering in one call; the only kind of symmetric encryption you should use.
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Aes key wrap
security · low: AES Key Wrap (RFC 3394/5649) and AES-GCM-SIV for deterministic, authenticated wrapping of key material
Dual control approval
security · low: Four-eyes / maker-checker approval with quorum policies for sensitive operations
Secure memory zeroization
security · low: Keep secrets in one locked, fixed-size, non-copyable region, erase them with writes the compiler must keep, and exclude them from dumps and swap.
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Passkeys (WebAuthn)
security · low: Phishing-resistant login with a per-site key pair held by the device or password manager; the server stores only a public key.
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One-time codes (HOTP, TOTP)
security · low: Short numeric codes derived from a shared secret plus a counter or the clock (HOTP, TOTP), or random codes sent by SMS or email; safe only with expiry, single use and attempt limits.
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Sliding-window counters
systems · low: Count events in the last W seconds with a ring of sub-bucket counters; the two-bucket weighted estimate gives rate limits in 16 bytes per key.
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Rsa cryptosystem
security · low: RSA key generation, OAEP encryption and PSS/PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures, key sizes and padding pitfalls
Segmented log
distributed · low: Split an append-only log into files named by their first offset, write only the newest, and find any record by binary search plus a sparse index.
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Object storage
cloud · low: S3-compatible blob storage at cents per GB-month with 11 nines durability; pick by egress price, request price and latency, not by storage price alone.
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Copy on write snapshots
storage · low: Point-in-time snapshots by sharing pages/extents and copying only on write
Failure bisection
search-sort · low: Binary search over commits, batches or inputs to isolate a failure
Dead-letter queue
distributed · low: A side queue for messages that keep failing: after N delivery attempts or a permanent error, park them with the reason so the main queue keeps moving.
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Idempotency keys
finance · low: Client-chosen unique key per logical operation, stored with a request fingerprint and the final response, so retries replay the first result instead of acting twice.
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Transparent interception
networking · low: Redirect traffic to a local proxy (iptables TPROXY/REDIRECT, eBPF) without app changes
Mime parsing
storage · low: RFC 5322/2045 headers, multipart bodies and transfer encodings
ECDH key exchange (X25519, P-256)
security · low: Each side multiplies the other's public curve point by its own scalar and both get the same point; always validate the peer key and run the result through a KDF.
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HKDF key derivation (extract-and-ex…
security · low: HMAC-based two-step key derivation: extract a uniform pseudorandom key from any secret, then expand it into as many context-bound keys as you need.
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Recursive-descent parsing
compilers · low: Hand-written top-down parser with one function per grammar rule; simple, fast, with full control over error messages and recovery.
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Aho-Corasick multi-pattern matching
search-sort · low: Find all occurrences of many fixed patterns in one pass over the text, in time independent of the pattern count, using a trie with failure links.
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SIMD substring search
search-sort · low: Find bytes or substrings by comparing 16-64 haystack positions per instruction against the needle's first and last byte, then verifying the rare candidates.
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LRU and CLOCK
systems · low: LRU evicts the least recently used entry via hash map plus linked list; CLOCK approximates it with a reference bit, so hits take no lock.
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Ebpf
hardware-os · low: Verified in-kernel programs on hooks (kprobes, XDP, tc) with maps
Ptrace process control
hardware-os · low: Ptrace: attach, read and write registers and memory, single-step, intercept signals
Seccomp bpf
security · low: Syscall filtering with seccomp BPF programs
fsync, O_DSYNC and O_DIRECT
hardware-os · low: What fsync, fdatasync, O_DSYNC, O_DIRECT and F_FULLFSYNC really guarantee on Linux and macOS, and the exact call sequences for crash-safe files.
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S3-FIFO
systems · low: Three FIFO queues (small, main, ghost) that evict one-hit wonders quickly and keep reused objects; low miss ratios with no list moves on hits.
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Control-flow graph
compilers · low: Split a linear instruction list into basic blocks and connect them by jumps; the graph every optimizer, SSA builder and dataflow pass walks.
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d-ary heap
data-structures · low: Array heap with d children per node (d = 4 typical): half the binary heap's depth, siblings in one cache line, faster priority queues.
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Fencing tokens
distributed · low: A number that grows with every lock grant and is checked by the protected resource, so a paused ex-holder's late write is rejected.
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BFS and DFS
graphs · low: The two basic graph traversals; BFS gives hop distances and levels, DFS gives discovery/finish order for cycles, components and topological order.
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Minimum spanning tree
graphs · low: Cheapest set of edges connecting all vertices; Kruskal sorts edges and joins components with union-find, Prim grows one tree, Boruvka merges in parallel rounds.
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Union-find
graphs · low: Disjoint-set forest with union by size and path compression; merges sets and answers same-set queries in effectively constant time.
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CRC32C checksums
hardware-os · low: The Castagnoli CRC-32 with dedicated instructions on x86 (SSE4.2) and ARMv8. It is the standard fast integrity check for storage blocks, logs and network frames.
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SIMD programming
hardware-os · low: Process 4-16 lanes per instruction with AVX2, AVX-512 or NEON via Rust std::arch, with runtime dispatch and a portable fallback.
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Sparse matrices (CSR)
numerics · low: Compressed sparse row stores only nonzeros as row pointers, column indices and values; SpMV streams them once, so it is memory-bandwidth bound.
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Constant time code
security · low: Writing secret-dependent code without branches or memory lookups on secrets; constant-time compare and select
Optimistic concurrency control
storage · low: Run transactions without locks, record what they read, and validate at commit that nothing changed; fastest when conflicts are rare.
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Slab allocator
systems · low: Pre-carve pages into equal-size slots per size class with an in-place free list: O(1) alloc and free, no external fragmentation, cache-warm reuse.
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