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Networking and edge
service-mesh
service mesh
Istio, Linkerd
System
Techniques · 21
Primitives · 65
service-mesh
Config distribution
distributed · medium: A control plane pushes versioned resource changes over long-lived streams; each node validates, ACKs or NACKs and keeps its last good copy, so a bad change stops at a canary.
›
Deterministic simulation testing
distributed · medium: Run the whole system in one thread under a seeded scheduler with simulated network, disk and clock, so every failure replays from its seed.
›
Primary-backup replication
distributed · medium: One node orders all writes and ships them to standbys; the acknowledgement rule (none, one, all) sets what a crash loses, and an external arbiter decides who takes over.
›
Service discovery
distributed · medium: Register endpoints with health and watch for changes (DNS, registries, watches)
Coverage-guided fuzzing
security · medium: Mutate inputs, run an instrumented target, and keep any input that reaches a new code edge; feedback turns blind guessing into incremental search.
›
TLS 1.3
security · medium: The standard encrypted, authenticated transport; one round trip, only forward-secret AEAD suites, and little left to misconfigure.
›
Workload identity (SPIFFE-style)
security · medium: A local agent works out which workload is calling, then hands it a short-lived signed identity that it renews automatically; no secret is shipped in advance.
›
Health checking
systems · low: Decide per backend whether to route to it using probes and real-traffic errors, with consecutive-count hysteresis, capped ejection and a panic fallback.
›
X509 certificates
security · low: Certificate chains, path validation, SANs, revocation and short-lived issuance
Mutual TLS
security · low: TLS where the client also proves a certificate key, so every connection carries a verified, rotatable machine identity.
›
Transparent interception
networking · low: Redirect traffic to a local proxy (iptables TPROXY/REDIRECT, eBPF) without app changes
Hdr histogram
data-structures · low: Log-linear bucketed histograms with bounded relative error for latency percentiles
Process supervision
hardware-os · low: A parent process starts services, reaps their exits and restarts them under a delay and burst-limit policy, then stops them with SIGTERM before SIGKILL.
›
Ebpf xdp
networking · low: EBPF programs at the XDP/tc hooks for in-kernel packet processing at line rate
HTTP/2
networking · low: Binary multiplexed framing for HTTP over one TCP connection: streams, per-stream and per-connection credit windows, HPACK header compression and the limits that contain abuse.
›
Power of two choices
networking · low: Pick two random backends and send to the less loaded one; exponentially better balance than random, with no global state and no herding.
›
Authorization models (RBAC, ABAC, R…
security · low: How to decide who may do what to which object; roles for coarse rules, relationships for sharing, and checks on every object.
›
Circuit breaker
systems · low: Stop calling a failing dependency for a while, probe it with trial calls, and resume on recovery: fail fast instead of piling up timeouts.
›
Exponential backoff with jitter
systems · low: Retry after delays that grow geometrically and are randomized, so failed clients spread out instead of hammering a recovering service in synchronized waves.
›
Graceful draining
systems · low: On a termination signal, stop taking new work, finish in-flight work until a deadline, tell clients to reconnect elsewhere, then exit; clients resume from a token.
›
Traffic splitting
systems · low: Weighted routing between versions for canaries and A/B, sticky by hash
Delta encoding
compression · low: Store differences between consecutive values instead of the values, turning sorted IDs, timestamps and counters into small numbers that pack into few bits.
›
Message sequence numbers
distributed · low: A per-stream counter on every message lets the receiver detect loss, duplicates and reordering, ack cheaply and resume after reconnect with "send from N".
›
+ 14 more techniques
+ 49 more primitives
System
Techniques · 21
Primitives · 65
service-mesh
Config distribution
distributed · medium: A control plane pushes versioned resource changes over long-lived streams; each node validates, ACKs or NACKs and keeps its last good copy, so a bad change stops at a canary.
›
Deterministic simulation testing
distributed · medium: Run the whole system in one thread under a seeded scheduler with simulated network, disk and clock, so every failure replays from its seed.
›
Primary-backup replication
distributed · medium: One node orders all writes and ships them to standbys; the acknowledgement rule (none, one, all) sets what a crash loses, and an external arbiter decides who takes over.
›
Service discovery
distributed · medium: Register endpoints with health and watch for changes (DNS, registries, watches)
Coverage-guided fuzzing
security · medium: Mutate inputs, run an instrumented target, and keep any input that reaches a new code edge; feedback turns blind guessing into incremental search.
›
TLS 1.3
security · medium: The standard encrypted, authenticated transport; one round trip, only forward-secret AEAD suites, and little left to misconfigure.
›
Workload identity (SPIFFE-style)
security · medium: A local agent works out which workload is calling, then hands it a short-lived signed identity that it renews automatically; no secret is shipped in advance.
›
Point-in-time recovery
storage · medium: Periodic base backups plus a continuously archived change log let you rebuild the state as of any instant, then branch from there.
›
Distributed tracing
systems · medium: Give each request a 128-bit id, record timed spans linked by parent ids, pass the ids in a header across every hop, and join the spans back into a tree afterwards.
›
Delta debugging
compilers · medium: Ddmin minimization of failing inputs or change sets
Fault injection
distributed · medium: Inject latency, errors, kills and partitions via proxies, netem or hooks
Watch notifications
distributed · medium: A store numbers every write; clients list at revision R, then watch from R+1 and receive an ordered change stream with no gap, no duplicate, and a resume point.
›
Key rotation
security · medium: Rotating keys without downtime: key ids, overlap windows, re-wrapping, JWKS publication, revocation
ARIES recovery
storage · medium: Three-pass crash recovery (analysis, redo, undo) for steal/no-force buffer pools; repeats history, then rolls back losers with compensation log records.
›
Columnar storage
storage · medium: Store each column contiguously so analytic scans read only the columns they need, compress well and run as tight SIMD loops.
›
Telemetry sampling
systems · medium: Head, tail and dynamic sampling of traces, events and logs to a budget
Envelope encryption
security · medium: Encrypt each object with its own data key and wrap that key under a KMS-held key, so rotation re-wraps 60 bytes and deleting a key shreds data.
›
Syscall interception
security · medium: Intercept syscalls via ptrace, seccomp user notify or a user-space kernel
Buffer pool
storage · medium: The database's own page cache (frames, page table, pin counts, dirty bits, replacement) so it, not the OS, controls eviction, write order and I/O.
›
MVCC
storage · medium: Keep timestamped versions of each row so readers see a consistent snapshot without blocking writers; the default concurrency control in modern databases.
›
Vectorized execution
storage · medium: Query operators pass batches of about 1-2K values per column instead of single tuples, amortizing interpretation overhead and enabling tight SIMD loops.
›
Health checking
systems · low: Decide per backend whether to route to it using probes and real-traffic errors, with consecutive-count hysteresis, capped ejection and a panic fallback.
›
X509 certificates
security · low: Certificate chains, path validation, SANs, revocation and short-lived issuance
Mutual TLS
security · low: TLS where the client also proves a certificate key, so every connection carries a verified, rotatable machine identity.
›
Transparent interception
networking · low: Redirect traffic to a local proxy (iptables TPROXY/REDIRECT, eBPF) without app changes
Hdr histogram
data-structures · low: Log-linear bucketed histograms with bounded relative error for latency percentiles
Process supervision
hardware-os · low: A parent process starts services, reaps their exits and restarts them under a delay and burst-limit policy, then stops them with SIGTERM before SIGKILL.
›
Ebpf xdp
networking · low: EBPF programs at the XDP/tc hooks for in-kernel packet processing at line rate
HTTP/2
networking · low: Binary multiplexed framing for HTTP over one TCP connection: streams, per-stream and per-connection credit windows, HPACK header compression and the limits that contain abuse.
›
Power of two choices
networking · low: Pick two random backends and send to the less loaded one; exponentially better balance than random, with no global state and no herding.
›
Authorization models (RBAC, ABAC, R…
security · low: How to decide who may do what to which object; roles for coarse rules, relationships for sharing, and checks on every object.
›
Circuit breaker
systems · low: Stop calling a failing dependency for a while, probe it with trial calls, and resume on recovery: fail fast instead of piling up timeouts.
›
Exponential backoff with jitter
systems · low: Retry after delays that grow geometrically and are randomized, so failed clients spread out instead of hammering a recovering service in synchronized waves.
›
Graceful draining
systems · low: On a termination signal, stop taking new work, finish in-flight work until a deadline, tell clients to reconnect elsewhere, then exit; clients resume from a token.
›
Traffic splitting
systems · low: Weighted routing between versions for canaries and A/B, sticky by hash
Delta encoding
compression · low: Store differences between consecutive values instead of the values, turning sorted IDs, timestamps and counters into small numbers that pack into few bits.
›
Message sequence numbers
distributed · low: A per-stream counter on every message lets the receiver detect loss, duplicates and reordering, ack cheaply and resume after reconnect with "send from N".
›
Grpc protocol
networking · low: GRPC framing over HTTP/2: unary and streaming RPCs, deadlines, status
Cooperative scheduling
concurrency · low: Green threads/coroutines yielding at await points on a user-space scheduler
Record replay
distributed · low: Record every nondeterministic input (time, randomness, I/O, model and tool outputs, per-tick player input) and re-execute deterministically for debugging, replays and state rebuild
PRNGs (PCG, xoshiro)
numerics · low: Small, fast, statistically strong non-cryptographic generators: PCG32 and xoshiro256**, with seeding, parallel streams and unbiased ranges.
›
Leases
distributed · low: A lock that expires on its own: bounded-time ownership that survives crashes and partitions, given bounded clock drift and fencing tokens on writes.
›
Write-ahead log
storage · low: Append each change to a checksummed sequential log and fsync it before touching data pages; the basis of crash durability in nearly every database.
›
DNS message format and client looku…
networking · low: Binary query/response format of DNS (RFC 1035) and how a stub client uses it: record types, name compression, UDP/TCP/EDNS sizes, TTL caching.
›
Code coverage instrumentation
compilers · low: Insert counters into compiled code to record which blocks, edges or lines ran; a spanning tree of the control-flow graph cuts the counters needed.
›
Fast hash functions
data-structures · low: Non-cryptographic hashes built from 64×64→128-bit multiplies and xor-shifts; pick by key size, trust level and whether the hash is persisted.
›
Sanitizers
security · low: ASan/UBSan/TSan shadow memory and instrumentation to catch memory bugs
AEAD (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305)
security · low: Authenticated encryption that encrypts and detects tampering in one call; the only kind of symmetric encryption you should use.
›
Cryptographic hashes (SHA-2, BLAKE3)
security · low: Collision-resistant fingerprints of data; SHA-256 for interoperability, BLAKE3 for speed, HMAC/HKDF for keyed uses.
›
ECDH key exchange (X25519, P-256)
security · low: Each side multiplies the other's public curve point by its own scalar and both get the same point; always validate the peer key and run the result through a KDF.
›
HKDF key derivation (extract-and-ex…
security · low: HMAC-based two-step key derivation: extract a uniform pseudorandom key from any secret, then expand it into as many context-bound keys as you need.
›
JSON Web Token (JWT)
security · low: A signed, URL-safe token carrying claims; the verifier's job is the checklist (pinned algorithm, key by kid, exp, aud, iss), not the format.
›
Object storage
cloud · low: S3-compatible blob storage at cents per GB-month with 11 nines durability; pick by egress price, request price and latency, not by storage price alone.
›
Copy on write snapshots
storage · low: Point-in-time snapshots by sharing pages/extents and copying only on write
Distributed ID generation
distributed · low: Mint unique, roughly time-sorted IDs on many nodes with no per-ID coordination: Snowflake (time, worker, sequence) or UUIDv7 (time, random).
›
Protobuf wire format
networking · low: Protocol Buffers wire format: tags, varints, length-delimited fields and schema evolution
Failure bisection
search-sort · low: Binary search over commits, batches or inputs to isolate a failure
Secrets management
security · low: Keep keys and passwords out of code and logs, give workloads short-lived identity instead of static keys, and make rotation routine.
›
Cron scheduling
systems · low: Cron expression parsing and next-fire-time computation, with catch-up and time-zone rules
Bit packing and PFOR
compression · low: Store blocks of integers with exactly b bits each and patch rare outliers separately (PFOR); the fastest integer codec family, billions of values per second.
›
Dictionary encoding
compression · low: Map values to small integer codes via a dictionary for compact, comparable columns
Zone maps
storage · low: Per-block min/max (and sparse primary) indexes to skip data during scans
Hash based sampling
data-structures · low: Deterministic sampling by hashing an entity id so all its events are kept or dropped together
Reservoir sampling
data-structures · low: Uniform k-sample from a stream of unknown length (Algorithm R/L)
Token bucket
systems · low: A bucket of up to b tokens refilled at rate r; requests spend tokens, enforcing an average rate while allowing bursts of b.
›
Aes key wrap
security · low: AES Key Wrap (RFC 3394/5649) and AES-GCM-SIV for deterministic, authenticated wrapping of key material
Csprng
security · low: OS-backed cryptographically secure random numbers (getrandom), and when a fast PRNG is not enough
Ebpf
hardware-os · low: Verified in-kernel programs on hooks (kprobes, XDP, tc) with maps
Ptrace process control
hardware-os · low: Ptrace: attach, read and write registers and memory, single-step, intercept signals
Seccomp bpf
security · low: Syscall filtering with seccomp BPF programs
fsync, O_DSYNC and O_DIRECT
hardware-os · low: What fsync, fdatasync, O_DSYNC, O_DIRECT and F_FULLFSYNC really guarantee on Linux and macOS, and the exact call sequences for crash-safe files.
›
LRU and CLOCK
systems · low: LRU evicts the least recently used entry via hash map plus linked list; CLOCK approximates it with a reference bit, so hits take no lock.
›
S3-FIFO
systems · low: Three FIFO queues (small, main, ghost) that evict one-hit wonders quickly and keep reused objects; low miss ratios with no list moves on hits.
›
Control-flow graph
compilers · low: Split a linear instruction list into basic blocks and connect them by jumps; the graph every optimizer, SSA builder and dataflow pass walks.
›
Varint (LEB128)
compression · low: Variable-length integers in 7-bit groups with a continuation bit; small numbers take 1 byte, the wire format of Protobuf, WebAssembly and DWARF.
›
d-ary heap
data-structures · low: Array heap with d children per node (d = 4 typical): half the binary heap's depth, siblings in one cache line, faster priority queues.
›
Fencing tokens
distributed · low: A number that grows with every lock grant and is checked by the protected resource, so a paused ex-holder's late write is rejected.
›
BFS and DFS
graphs · low: The two basic graph traversals; BFS gives hop distances and levels, DFS gives discovery/finish order for cycles, components and topological order.
›
Minimum spanning tree
graphs · low: Cheapest set of edges connecting all vertices; Kruskal sorts edges and joins components with union-find, Prim grows one tree, Boruvka merges in parallel rounds.
›
Union-find
graphs · low: Disjoint-set forest with union by size and path compression; merges sets and answers same-set queries in effectively constant time.
›
CRC32C checksums
hardware-os · low: The Castagnoli CRC-32 with dedicated instructions on x86 (SSE4.2) and ARMv8. It is the standard fast integrity check for storage blocks, logs and network frames.
›
SIMD programming
hardware-os · low: Process 4-16 lanes per instruction with AVX2, AVX-512 or NEON via Rust std::arch, with runtime dispatch and a portable fallback.
›
Sparse matrices (CSR)
numerics · low: Compressed sparse row stores only nonzeros as row pointers, column indices and values; SpMV streams them once, so it is memory-bandwidth bound.
›
Constant time code
security · low: Writing secret-dependent code without branches or memory lookups on secrets; constant-time compare and select
OAuth 2 and OpenID Connect
security · low: Delegated authorization (OAuth 2) and login on top of it (OIDC); use authorization code + PKCE for every user-facing client.
›
Sliding-window counters
systems · low: Count events in the last W seconds with a ring of sub-bucket counters; the two-bucket weighted estimate gives rate limits in 16 bytes per key.
›
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