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remote-attestation

secure boot and remote attestation

TPM, Android Key Attestation

SystemTechniques · 5Primitives · 13 remote-attestation Certificate revocationsecurity · medium: CRLs, OCSP, OCSP stapling, short-lived certificates and CRLite-style filters for revoked certificatesMeasured bootsecurity · medium: Each boot stage hashes the next into TPM PCRs (extend) and logs events for later attestationRemote attestationsecurity · medium: Hardware-signed evidence (TPM quotes, SGX/TDX quotes, SEV-SNP reports, key attestation) proving device, key or enclave state to a verifierTransparency logsecurity · medium: A public append-only Merkle tree whose signed heads let anyone verify an entry is present and history was only extended, with log-size proofs.›Witness cosigningsecurity · medium: Independent witnesses cosign log checkpoints so a log cannot show different views to different clientsECDSA signaturessecurity · low: The elliptic-curve signature standardised in FIPS 186-5 (P-256) and used by secp256k1 ledgers; 64-byte signatures, but a repeated or biased nonce leaks the private key.›X509 certificatessecurity · low: Certificate chains, path validation, SANs, revocation and short-lived issuanceCryptographic hashes (SHA-2, BLAKE3)security · low: Collision-resistant fingerprints of data; SHA-256 for interoperability, BLAKE3 for speed, HMAC/HKDF for keyed uses.›Secure boot chainsecurity · low: Each boot stage verifies the signature of the next before running it, anchored in an immutable ROM key hash, with version counters against downgrade and a TPM log of what ran.›Csprngsecurity · low: OS-backed cryptographically secure random numbers (getrandom), and when a fast PRNG is not enoughTrusted execution environmentssecurity · low: Enclaves/confidential VMs with remote attestation for computing on sealed dataRsa cryptosystemsecurity · low: RSA key generation, OAEP encryption and PSS/PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures, key sizes and padding pitfallsBloom filterdata-structures · low: Bit array answering "definitely not present" or "probably present" in about 10 bits per key for 1 % false positives; inserts are cheap, deletes impossible.›HTTP caching semanticsnetworking · low: The rules (RFC 9111) that decide whether a stored response is still fresh, and how a cheap conditional request revalidates it when it is not.›Hardware backed keystoresecurity · low: Non-exportable keys in Secure Enclave, StrongBox, TPM: generation, use policies, biometric gatingMerkle treedata-structures · low: Hash tree for verifying and diffing large datasets with logarithmic proofsSegmented logdistributed · low: Split an append-only log into files named by their first offset, write only the newest, and find any record by binary search plus a sparse index.›Digital signatures (Ed25519)security · low: Small, fast, deterministic public-key signatures that prove who produced a message; the default for tokens, releases and protocols.›

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