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Communication and media
e2e-messaging
end-to-end encrypted messaging
Signal protocol
System
Techniques · 7
Primitives · 23
e2e-messaging
Durable job queue
distributed · medium: Persisted tasks that workers lease for a visibility timeout, ack on success and retry with backoff; at-least-once execution that survives worker and queue crashes.
›
Incremental sync cursors
distributed · medium: The client keeps one opaque token; each pull returns only the changes after it plus the next token, so sync cost scales with what changed, not with the dataset.
›
Double ratchet
security · medium: Signal Double Ratchet: DH and symmetric ratchets for forward secrecy
Group messaging encryption
security · medium: Sender keys and MLS TreeKEM for scalable end-to-end group encryption
Transparency log
security · medium: A public append-only Merkle tree whose signed heads let anyone verify an entry is present and history was only extended, with log-size proofs.
›
X3dh key agreement
security · medium: X3DH/PQXDH asynchronous initial key agreement with prekeys
Witness cosigning
security · medium: Independent witnesses cosign log checkpoints so a log cannot show different views to different clients
AEAD (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305)
security · low: Authenticated encryption that encrypts and detects tampering in one call; the only kind of symmetric encryption you should use.
›
ECDH key exchange (X25519, P-256)
security · low: Each side multiplies the other's public curve point by its own scalar and both get the same point; always validate the peer key and run the result through a KDF.
›
HKDF key derivation (extract-and-ex…
security · low: HMAC-based two-step key derivation: extract a uniform pseudorandom key from any secret, then expand it into as many context-bound keys as you need.
›
Digital signatures (Ed25519)
security · low: Small, fast, deterministic public-key signatures that prove who produced a message; the default for tokens, releases and protocols.
›
Cryptographic hashes (SHA-2, BLAKE3)
security · low: Collision-resistant fingerprints of data; SHA-256 for interoperability, BLAKE3 for speed, HMAC/HKDF for keyed uses.
›
Post quantum kem
security · low: ML-KEM (Kyber) key encapsulation, used in hybrid key exchange
Dead-letter queue
distributed · low: A side queue for messages that keep failing: after N delivery attempts or a permanent error, park them with the reason so the main queue keeps moving.
›
Leases
distributed · low: A lock that expires on its own: bounded-time ownership that survives crashes and partitions, given bounded clock drift and fencing tokens on writes.
›
Idempotency keys
finance · low: Client-chosen unique key per logical operation, stored with a request fingerprint and the final response, so retries replay the first result instead of acting twice.
›
Write-ahead log
storage · low: Append each change to a checksummed sequential log and fsync it before touching data pages; the basis of crash durability in nearly every database.
›
Exponential backoff with jitter
systems · low: Retry after delays that grow geometrically and are randomized, so failed clients spread out instead of hammering a recovering service in synchronized waves.
›
Message sequence numbers
distributed · low: A per-stream counter on every message lets the receiver detect loss, duplicates and reordering, ack cheaply and resume after reconnect with "send from N".
›
Cursor pagination
networking · low: Keyset/opaque-cursor pagination for stable incremental reads from APIs and tables
Secure memory zeroization
security · low: Keep secrets in one locked, fixed-size, non-copyable region, erase them with writes the compiler must keep, and exclude them from dumps and swap.
›
Merkle tree
data-structures · low: Hash tree for verifying and diffing large datasets with logarithmic proofs
Segmented log
distributed · low: Split an append-only log into files named by their first offset, write only the newest, and find any record by binary search plus a sparse index.
›
+ 7 more primitives
System
Techniques · 7
Primitives · 23
e2e-messaging
Durable job queue
distributed · medium: Persisted tasks that workers lease for a visibility timeout, ack on success and retry with backoff; at-least-once execution that survives worker and queue crashes.
›
Incremental sync cursors
distributed · medium: The client keeps one opaque token; each pull returns only the changes after it plus the next token, so sync cost scales with what changed, not with the dataset.
›
Double ratchet
security · medium: Signal Double Ratchet: DH and symmetric ratchets for forward secrecy
Group messaging encryption
security · medium: Sender keys and MLS TreeKEM for scalable end-to-end group encryption
Transparency log
security · medium: A public append-only Merkle tree whose signed heads let anyone verify an entry is present and history was only extended, with log-size proofs.
›
X3dh key agreement
security · medium: X3DH/PQXDH asynchronous initial key agreement with prekeys
Witness cosigning
security · medium: Independent witnesses cosign log checkpoints so a log cannot show different views to different clients
AEAD (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305)
security · low: Authenticated encryption that encrypts and detects tampering in one call; the only kind of symmetric encryption you should use.
›
ECDH key exchange (X25519, P-256)
security · low: Each side multiplies the other's public curve point by its own scalar and both get the same point; always validate the peer key and run the result through a KDF.
›
HKDF key derivation (extract-and-ex…
security · low: HMAC-based two-step key derivation: extract a uniform pseudorandom key from any secret, then expand it into as many context-bound keys as you need.
›
Digital signatures (Ed25519)
security · low: Small, fast, deterministic public-key signatures that prove who produced a message; the default for tokens, releases and protocols.
›
Cryptographic hashes (SHA-2, BLAKE3)
security · low: Collision-resistant fingerprints of data; SHA-256 for interoperability, BLAKE3 for speed, HMAC/HKDF for keyed uses.
›
Post quantum kem
security · low: ML-KEM (Kyber) key encapsulation, used in hybrid key exchange
Dead-letter queue
distributed · low: A side queue for messages that keep failing: after N delivery attempts or a permanent error, park them with the reason so the main queue keeps moving.
›
Leases
distributed · low: A lock that expires on its own: bounded-time ownership that survives crashes and partitions, given bounded clock drift and fencing tokens on writes.
›
Idempotency keys
finance · low: Client-chosen unique key per logical operation, stored with a request fingerprint and the final response, so retries replay the first result instead of acting twice.
›
Write-ahead log
storage · low: Append each change to a checksummed sequential log and fsync it before touching data pages; the basis of crash durability in nearly every database.
›
Exponential backoff with jitter
systems · low: Retry after delays that grow geometrically and are randomized, so failed clients spread out instead of hammering a recovering service in synchronized waves.
›
Message sequence numbers
distributed · low: A per-stream counter on every message lets the receiver detect loss, duplicates and reordering, ack cheaply and resume after reconnect with "send from N".
›
Cursor pagination
networking · low: Keyset/opaque-cursor pagination for stable incremental reads from APIs and tables
Secure memory zeroization
security · low: Keep secrets in one locked, fixed-size, non-copyable region, erase them with writes the compiler must keep, and exclude them from dumps and swap.
›
Merkle tree
data-structures · low: Hash tree for verifying and diffing large datasets with logarithmic proofs
Segmented log
distributed · low: Split an append-only log into files named by their first offset, write only the newest, and find any record by binary search plus a sparse index.
›
Fencing tokens
distributed · low: A number that grows with every lock grant and is checked by the protected resource, so a paused ex-holder's late write is rejected.
›
CRC32C checksums
hardware-os · low: The Castagnoli CRC-32 with dedicated instructions on x86 (SSE4.2) and ARMv8. It is the standard fast integrity check for storage blocks, logs and network frames.
›
fsync, O_DSYNC and O_DIRECT
hardware-os · low: What fsync, fdatasync, O_DSYNC, O_DIRECT and F_FULLFSYNC really guarantee on Linux and macOS, and the exact call sequences for crash-safe files.
›
SIMD programming
hardware-os · low: Process 4-16 lanes per instruction with AVX2, AVX-512 or NEON via Rust std::arch, with runtime dispatch and a portable fallback.
›
PRNGs (PCG, xoshiro)
numerics · low: Small, fast, statistically strong non-cryptographic generators: PCG32 and xoshiro256**, with seeding, parallel streams and unbiased ranges.
›
Constant time code
security · low: Writing secret-dependent code without branches or memory lookups on secrets; constant-time compare and select
Csprng
security · low: OS-backed cryptographically secure random numbers (getrandom), and when a fast PRNG is not enough
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