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System
Techniques · 18
Primitives · 64
code-hosting
Deterministic simulation testing
distributed · medium: Run the whole system in one thread under a seeded scheduler with simulated network, disk and clock, so every failure replays from its seed.
›
Durable job queue
distributed · medium: Persisted tasks that workers lease for a visibility timeout, ack on success and retry with backoff; at-least-once execution that survives worker and queue crashes.
›
Primary-backup replication
distributed · medium: One node orders all writes and ships them to standbys; the acknowledgement rule (none, one, all) sets what a crash loses, and an external arbiter decides who takes over.
›
Quorum replication
distributed · medium: Leaderless replication: write to W of N replicas, read from R; overlap (R + W > N) makes reads see the latest completed write.
›
Set reconciliation
distributed · medium: Have/want negotiation and IBLT-style sync of two sets
Three-way merge
distributed · medium: Merge two descendants against their common ancestor: take whichever side changed, report a conflict only where both changed the same spot differently.
›
Webhook delivery
networking · medium: Reliable server-to-server HTTP callbacks: signed POSTs, 2xx-means-done, retries over days with jitter, endpoint disabling, SSRF guards and idempotent receivers.
›
Consistent hashing
distributed · low: Hash nodes and keys onto a ring; each key belongs to the next node clockwise, so membership changes move only about 1/n of keys.
›
Lowest common ancestor
graphs · low: LCA/merge-base computation in trees and DAGs
Merkle tree
data-structures · low: Hash tree for verifying and diffing large datasets with logarithmic proofs
Token bucket
systems · low: A bucket of up to b tokens refilled at rate r; requests spend tokens, enforcing an average rate while allowing bursts of b.
›
Mark-sweep garbage collection
compilers · low: Find everything reachable from the roots, free the rest in place; handles cycles, never moves objects, and is the base of most production collectors.
›
Hdr histogram
data-structures · low: Log-linear bucketed histograms with bounded relative error for latency percentiles
Process supervision
hardware-os · low: A parent process starts services, reaps their exits and restarts them under a delay and burst-limit policy, then stops them with SIGTERM before SIGKILL.
›
Authorization models (RBAC, ABAC, R…
security · low: How to decide who may do what to which object; roles for coarse rules, relationships for sharing, and checks on every object.
›
Html sanitization
security · low: Allowlist-based HTML sanitizing of untrusted markup
Mutual TLS
security · low: TLS where the client also proves a certificate key, so every connection carries a verified, rotatable machine identity.
›
OAuth 2 and OpenID Connect
security · low: Delegated authorization (OAuth 2) and login on top of it (OIDC); use authorization code + PKCE for every user-facing client.
›
Passkeys (WebAuthn)
security · low: Phishing-resistant login with a per-site key pair held by the device or password manager; the server stores only a public key.
›
SSH protocol (transport, auth, chan…
security · low: A three-layer protocol on one TCP connection: encrypted packet transport, user authentication, then multiplexed channels with windows for shells, files and port forwards.
›
Content-addressed storage
storage · low: Store each blob under the hash of its bytes: immutable, deduplicated by construction, self-verifying on every read, and composable into Merkle trees.
›
Graceful draining
systems · low: On a termination signal, stop taking new work, finish in-flight work until a deadline, tell clients to reconnect elsewhere, then exit; clients resume from a token.
›
Cooperative scheduling
concurrency · low: Green threads/coroutines yielding at await points on a user-space scheduler
+ 11 more techniques
+ 48 more primitives
System
Techniques · 18
Primitives · 64
code-hosting
Deterministic simulation testing
distributed · medium: Run the whole system in one thread under a seeded scheduler with simulated network, disk and clock, so every failure replays from its seed.
›
Durable job queue
distributed · medium: Persisted tasks that workers lease for a visibility timeout, ack on success and retry with backoff; at-least-once execution that survives worker and queue crashes.
›
Primary-backup replication
distributed · medium: One node orders all writes and ships them to standbys; the acknowledgement rule (none, one, all) sets what a crash loses, and an external arbiter decides who takes over.
›
Quorum replication
distributed · medium: Leaderless replication: write to W of N replicas, read from R; overlap (R + W > N) makes reads see the latest completed write.
›
Set reconciliation
distributed · medium: Have/want negotiation and IBLT-style sync of two sets
Three-way merge
distributed · medium: Merge two descendants against their common ancestor: take whichever side changed, report a conflict only where both changed the same spot differently.
›
Webhook delivery
networking · medium: Reliable server-to-server HTTP callbacks: signed POSTs, 2xx-means-done, retries over days with jitter, endpoint disabling, SSRF guards and idempotent receivers.
›
Myers diff
search-sort · medium: Greedy O(ND) shortest edit script between two sequences, the default of git and GNU diff; fast when the inputs are similar.
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Coverage-guided fuzzing
security · medium: Mutate inputs, run an instrumented target, and keep any input that reaches a new code edge; feedback turns blind guessing into incremental search.
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Tamper-evident audit log
security · medium: An append-only log whose Merkle root, signed per batch, lets anyone verify an entry is present and history was never rewritten, with log-size proofs.
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Point-in-time recovery
storage · medium: Periodic base backups plus a continuously archived change log let you rebuild the state as of any instant, then branch from there.
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Delta debugging
compilers · medium: Ddmin minimization of failing inputs or change sets
Anti-entropy repair
distributed · medium: Replicas compare hash trees of a key range, descend only into differing subtrees and stream just those ranges, healing silent divergence in the background.
›
Fault injection
distributed · medium: Inject latency, errors, kills and partitions via proxies, netem or hooks
Hinted handoff
distributed · medium: Park a write meant for a down replica as a tagged hint on a healthy node, replay it when the replica returns, and count it toward the write quorum only if availability matters more than consistency.
›
ARIES recovery
storage · medium: Three-pass crash recovery (analysis, redo, undo) for steal/no-force buffer pools; repeats history, then rolls back losers with compensation log records.
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Syscall interception
security · medium: Intercept syscalls via ptrace, seccomp user notify or a user-space kernel
Buffer pool
storage · medium: The database's own page cache (frames, page table, pin counts, dirty bits, replacement) so it, not the OS, controls eviction, write order and I/O.
›
Consistent hashing
distributed · low: Hash nodes and keys onto a ring; each key belongs to the next node clockwise, so membership changes move only about 1/n of keys.
›
Lowest common ancestor
graphs · low: LCA/merge-base computation in trees and DAGs
Merkle tree
data-structures · low: Hash tree for verifying and diffing large datasets with logarithmic proofs
Token bucket
systems · low: A bucket of up to b tokens refilled at rate r; requests spend tokens, enforcing an average rate while allowing bursts of b.
›
Mark-sweep garbage collection
compilers · low: Find everything reachable from the roots, free the rest in place; handles cycles, never moves objects, and is the base of most production collectors.
›
Hdr histogram
data-structures · low: Log-linear bucketed histograms with bounded relative error for latency percentiles
Process supervision
hardware-os · low: A parent process starts services, reaps their exits and restarts them under a delay and burst-limit policy, then stops them with SIGTERM before SIGKILL.
›
Authorization models (RBAC, ABAC, R…
security · low: How to decide who may do what to which object; roles for coarse rules, relationships for sharing, and checks on every object.
›
Html sanitization
security · low: Allowlist-based HTML sanitizing of untrusted markup
Mutual TLS
security · low: TLS where the client also proves a certificate key, so every connection carries a verified, rotatable machine identity.
›
OAuth 2 and OpenID Connect
security · low: Delegated authorization (OAuth 2) and login on top of it (OIDC); use authorization code + PKCE for every user-facing client.
›
Passkeys (WebAuthn)
security · low: Phishing-resistant login with a per-site key pair held by the device or password manager; the server stores only a public key.
›
SSH protocol (transport, auth, chan…
security · low: A three-layer protocol on one TCP connection: encrypted packet transport, user authentication, then multiplexed channels with windows for shells, files and port forwards.
›
Content-addressed storage
storage · low: Store each blob under the hash of its bytes: immutable, deduplicated by construction, self-verifying on every read, and composable into Merkle trees.
›
Graceful draining
systems · low: On a termination signal, stop taking new work, finish in-flight work until a deadline, tell clients to reconnect elsewhere, then exit; clients resume from a token.
›
Cooperative scheduling
concurrency · low: Green threads/coroutines yielding at await points on a user-space scheduler
Record replay
distributed · low: Record every nondeterministic input (time, randomness, I/O, model and tool outputs, per-tick player input) and re-execute deterministically for debugging, replays and state rebuild
PRNGs (PCG, xoshiro)
numerics · low: Small, fast, statistically strong non-cryptographic generators: PCG32 and xoshiro256**, with seeding, parallel streams and unbiased ranges.
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Dead-letter queue
distributed · low: A side queue for messages that keep failing: after N delivery attempts or a permanent error, park them with the reason so the main queue keeps moving.
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Leases
distributed · low: A lock that expires on its own: bounded-time ownership that survives crashes and partitions, given bounded clock drift and fencing tokens on writes.
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Idempotency keys
finance · low: Client-chosen unique key per logical operation, stored with a request fingerprint and the final response, so retries replay the first result instead of acting twice.
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Write-ahead log
storage · low: Append each change to a checksummed sequential log and fsync it before touching data pages; the basis of crash durability in nearly every database.
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Exponential backoff with jitter
systems · low: Retry after delays that grow geometrically and are randomized, so failed clients spread out instead of hammering a recovering service in synchronized waves.
›
Health checking
systems · low: Decide per backend whether to route to it using probes and real-traffic errors, with consecutive-count hysteresis, capped ejection and a panic fallback.
›
Vector clocks
distributed · low: One counter per node; comparing two vectors tells whether events are ordered or concurrent, which is exactly what conflict detection needs.
›
Bloom filter
data-structures · low: Bit array answering "definitely not present" or "probably present" in about 10 bits per key for 1 % false positives; inserts are cheap, deletes impossible.
›
Fast hash functions
data-structures · low: Non-cryptographic hashes built from 64×64→128-bit multiplies and xor-shifts; pick by key size, trust level and whether the hash is persisted.
›
Hmac request signing
security · low: HMAC canonical-request signatures and presigned URLs (SigV4 style) with expiry
Circuit breaker
systems · low: Stop calling a failing dependency for a while, probe it with trial calls, and resume on recovery: fail fast instead of piling up timeouts.
›
Rolling hash
data-structures · low: Rabin-Karp polynomial rolling hashes and winnowing for substring fingerprints and document matching
Edit distance
search-sort · low: Levenshtein/Damerau distance by DP, bit-parallel Myers variant
Code coverage instrumentation
compilers · low: Insert counters into compiled code to record which blocks, edges or lines ran; a spanning tree of the control-flow graph cuts the counters needed.
›
Sanitizers
security · low: ASan/UBSan/TSan shadow memory and instrumentation to catch memory bugs
Segmented log
distributed · low: Split an append-only log into files named by their first offset, write only the newest, and find any record by binary search plus a sparse index.
›
Digital signatures (Ed25519)
security · low: Small, fast, deterministic public-key signatures that prove who produced a message; the default for tokens, releases and protocols.
›
Trusted timestamping
security · low: RFC 3161 time-stamp tokens: a TSA signs a hash with time, proving data existed then
Object storage
cloud · low: S3-compatible blob storage at cents per GB-month with 11 nines durability; pick by egress price, request price and latency, not by storage price alone.
›
Copy on write snapshots
storage · low: Point-in-time snapshots by sharing pages/extents and copying only on write
Failure bisection
search-sort · low: Binary search over commits, batches or inputs to isolate a failure
Range partitioning
distributed · low: Cut the sorted key space into contiguous half-open ranges kept in a boundary map; split hot or big ranges, merge small ones, move ranges between nodes.
›
Transparent interception
networking · low: Redirect traffic to a local proxy (iptables TPROXY/REDIRECT, eBPF) without app changes
Phi accrual failure detector
distributed · low: Instead of a fixed heartbeat timeout, output a continuous suspicion level φ from the observed heartbeat interval distribution; adapts to each link's jitter.
›
Ebpf
hardware-os · low: Verified in-kernel programs on hooks (kprobes, XDP, tc) with maps
Ptrace process control
hardware-os · low: Ptrace: attach, read and write registers and memory, single-step, intercept signals
Seccomp bpf
security · low: Syscall filtering with seccomp BPF programs
fsync, O_DSYNC and O_DIRECT
hardware-os · low: What fsync, fdatasync, O_DSYNC, O_DIRECT and F_FULLFSYNC really guarantee on Linux and macOS, and the exact call sequences for crash-safe files.
›
LRU and CLOCK
systems · low: LRU evicts the least recently used entry via hash map plus linked list; CLOCK approximates it with a reference bit, so hits take no lock.
›
S3-FIFO
systems · low: Three FIFO queues (small, main, ghost) that evict one-hit wonders quickly and keep reused objects; low miss ratios with no list moves on hits.
›
Control-flow graph
compilers · low: Split a linear instruction list into basic blocks and connect them by jumps; the graph every optimizer, SSA builder and dataflow pass walks.
›
d-ary heap
data-structures · low: Array heap with d children per node (d = 4 typical): half the binary heap's depth, siblings in one cache line, faster priority queues.
›
Merkle dag
data-structures · low: Content-addressed DAG of hashed nodes (git trees/commits) for dedupe and verifiable history
Fencing tokens
distributed · low: A number that grows with every lock grant and is checked by the protected resource, so a paused ex-holder's late write is rejected.
›
BFS and DFS
graphs · low: The two basic graph traversals; BFS gives hop distances and levels, DFS gives discovery/finish order for cycles, components and topological order.
›
Minimum spanning tree
graphs · low: Cheapest set of edges connecting all vertices; Kruskal sorts edges and joins components with union-find, Prim grows one tree, Boruvka merges in parallel rounds.
›
Union-find
graphs · low: Disjoint-set forest with union by size and path compression; merges sets and answers same-set queries in effectively constant time.
›
Atomic file replacement
hardware-os · low: Write temp file, fsync, rename over target, fsync directory: crash-safe whole-file updates
CRC32C checksums
hardware-os · low: The Castagnoli CRC-32 with dedicated instructions on x86 (SSE4.2) and ARMv8. It is the standard fast integrity check for storage blocks, logs and network frames.
›
SIMD programming
hardware-os · low: Process 4-16 lanes per instruction with AVX2, AVX-512 or NEON via Rust std::arch, with runtime dispatch and a portable fallback.
›
Sparse matrices (CSR)
numerics · low: Compressed sparse row stores only nonzeros as row pointers, column indices and values; SpMV streams them once, so it is memory-bandwidth bound.
›
Cryptographic hashes (SHA-2, BLAKE3)
security · low: Collision-resistant fingerprints of data; SHA-256 for interoperability, BLAKE3 for speed, HMAC/HKDF for keyed uses.
›
Csprng
security · low: OS-backed cryptographically secure random numbers (getrandom), and when a fast PRNG is not enough
JSON Web Token (JWT)
security · low: A signed, URL-safe token carrying claims; the verifier's job is the checklist (pinned algorithm, key by kid, exp, aud, iss), not the format.
›
Slab allocator
systems · low: Pre-carve pages into equal-size slots per size class with an in-place free list: O(1) alloc and free, no external fragmentation, cache-warm reuse.
›
Sliding-window counters
systems · low: Count events in the last W seconds with a ring of sub-bucket counters; the two-bucket weighted estimate gives rate limits in 16 bytes per key.
›
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