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Security and identity
auth-service
password and passkey authentication
WebAuthn backend
System
Techniques · 13
Primitives · 57
auth-service
Deterministic simulation testing
distributed · medium: Run the whole system in one thread under a seeded scheduler with simulated network, disk and clock, so every failure replays from its seed.
›
Primary-backup replication
distributed · medium: One node orders all writes and ships them to standbys; the acknowledgement rule (none, one, all) sets what a crash loses, and an external arbiter decides who takes over.
›
Coverage-guided fuzzing
security · medium: Mutate inputs, run an instrumented target, and keep any input that reaches a new code edge; feedback turns blind guessing into incremental search.
›
Device fingerprinting
security · medium: Collect stable and volatile device signals, hash the stable core for exact lookup, fuzzy-match the rest with drift tolerance, and feed the result into a risk score.
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Remote attestation
security · medium: Hardware-signed evidence (TPM quotes, SGX/TDX quotes, SEV-SNP reports, key attestation) proving device, key or enclave state to a verifier
TLS 1.3
security · medium: The standard encrypted, authenticated transport; one round trip, only forward-secret AEAD suites, and little left to misconfigure.
›
Point-in-time recovery
storage · medium: Periodic base backups plus a continuously archived change log let you rebuild the state as of any instant, then branch from there.
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Csprng
security · low: OS-backed cryptographically secure random numbers (getrandom), and when a fast PRNG is not enough
Hdr histogram
data-structures · low: Log-linear bucketed histograms with bounded relative error for latency percentiles
Process supervision
hardware-os · low: A parent process starts services, reaps their exits and restarts them under a delay and burst-limit policy, then stops them with SIGTERM before SIGKILL.
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Cbor cose
security · low: CBOR binary encoding and COSE signing/encryption structures (WebAuthn, C2PA, attestation)
Constant time code
security · low: Writing secret-dependent code without branches or memory lookups on secrets; constant-time compare and select
ECDSA signatures
security · low: The elliptic-curve signature standardised in FIPS 186-5 (P-256) and used by secp256k1 ledgers; 64-byte signatures, but a repeated or biased nonce leaks the private key.
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JSON Web Token (JWT)
security · low: A signed, URL-safe token carrying claims; the verifier's job is the checklist (pinned algorithm, key by kid, exp, aud, iss), not the format.
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K anonymity hash prefix
security · low: Querying a breach/blocklist by sending only a short hash prefix and matching suffixes locally
Message authentication codes (HMAC,…
security · low: A keyed short tag proving a message is unmodified and came from a key holder; pick HMAC, CMAC, KMAC or a one-time polynomial MAC by what primitive you already have.
›
Mutual TLS
security · low: TLS where the client also proves a certificate key, so every connection carries a verified, rotatable machine identity.
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OWASP Top 10 risks
security · low: The web and API vulnerability classes that cause most real breaches, each with the one structural fix that removes it.
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Passkeys (WebAuthn)
security · low: Phishing-resistant login with a per-site key pair held by the device or password manager; the server stores only a public key.
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Password hashing (Argon2id)
security · low: Memory-hard, salted, deliberately slow hashing so stolen password databases can't be cracked cheaply on GPUs.
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Sessions vs tokens
security · low: Opaque server-side sessions in cookies for browsers, short-lived signed tokens between services; revocation decides most cases.
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One-time codes (HOTP, TOTP)
security · low: Short numeric codes derived from a shared secret plus a counter or the clock (HOTP, TOTP), or random codes sent by SMS or email; safe only with expiry, single use and attempt limits.
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GCRA
systems · low: Generic Cell Rate Algorithm: a token bucket stored as one theoretical arrival time per key, updated with one compare-and-swap; exact limits in 8 bytes.
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+ 6 more techniques
+ 41 more primitives
System
Techniques · 13
Primitives · 57
auth-service
Deterministic simulation testing
distributed · medium: Run the whole system in one thread under a seeded scheduler with simulated network, disk and clock, so every failure replays from its seed.
›
Primary-backup replication
distributed · medium: One node orders all writes and ships them to standbys; the acknowledgement rule (none, one, all) sets what a crash loses, and an external arbiter decides who takes over.
›
Coverage-guided fuzzing
security · medium: Mutate inputs, run an instrumented target, and keep any input that reaches a new code edge; feedback turns blind guessing into incremental search.
›
Device fingerprinting
security · medium: Collect stable and volatile device signals, hash the stable core for exact lookup, fuzzy-match the rest with drift tolerance, and feed the result into a risk score.
›
Remote attestation
security · medium: Hardware-signed evidence (TPM quotes, SGX/TDX quotes, SEV-SNP reports, key attestation) proving device, key or enclave state to a verifier
TLS 1.3
security · medium: The standard encrypted, authenticated transport; one round trip, only forward-secret AEAD suites, and little left to misconfigure.
›
Point-in-time recovery
storage · medium: Periodic base backups plus a continuously archived change log let you rebuild the state as of any instant, then branch from there.
›
Delta debugging
compilers · medium: Ddmin minimization of failing inputs or change sets
Fault injection
distributed · medium: Inject latency, errors, kills and partitions via proxies, netem or hooks
Measured boot
security · medium: Each boot stage hashes the next into TPM PCRs (extend) and logs events for later attestation
ARIES recovery
storage · medium: Three-pass crash recovery (analysis, redo, undo) for steal/no-force buffer pools; repeats history, then rolls back losers with compensation log records.
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Syscall interception
security · medium: Intercept syscalls via ptrace, seccomp user notify or a user-space kernel
Buffer pool
storage · medium: The database's own page cache (frames, page table, pin counts, dirty bits, replacement) so it, not the OS, controls eviction, write order and I/O.
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Csprng
security · low: OS-backed cryptographically secure random numbers (getrandom), and when a fast PRNG is not enough
Hdr histogram
data-structures · low: Log-linear bucketed histograms with bounded relative error for latency percentiles
Process supervision
hardware-os · low: A parent process starts services, reaps their exits and restarts them under a delay and burst-limit policy, then stops them with SIGTERM before SIGKILL.
›
Cbor cose
security · low: CBOR binary encoding and COSE signing/encryption structures (WebAuthn, C2PA, attestation)
Constant time code
security · low: Writing secret-dependent code without branches or memory lookups on secrets; constant-time compare and select
ECDSA signatures
security · low: The elliptic-curve signature standardised in FIPS 186-5 (P-256) and used by secp256k1 ledgers; 64-byte signatures, but a repeated or biased nonce leaks the private key.
›
JSON Web Token (JWT)
security · low: A signed, URL-safe token carrying claims; the verifier's job is the checklist (pinned algorithm, key by kid, exp, aud, iss), not the format.
›
K anonymity hash prefix
security · low: Querying a breach/blocklist by sending only a short hash prefix and matching suffixes locally
Message authentication codes (HMAC,…
security · low: A keyed short tag proving a message is unmodified and came from a key holder; pick HMAC, CMAC, KMAC or a one-time polynomial MAC by what primitive you already have.
›
Mutual TLS
security · low: TLS where the client also proves a certificate key, so every connection carries a verified, rotatable machine identity.
›
OWASP Top 10 risks
security · low: The web and API vulnerability classes that cause most real breaches, each with the one structural fix that removes it.
›
Passkeys (WebAuthn)
security · low: Phishing-resistant login with a per-site key pair held by the device or password manager; the server stores only a public key.
›
Password hashing (Argon2id)
security · low: Memory-hard, salted, deliberately slow hashing so stolen password databases can't be cracked cheaply on GPUs.
›
Sessions vs tokens
security · low: Opaque server-side sessions in cookies for browsers, short-lived signed tokens between services; revocation decides most cases.
›
One-time codes (HOTP, TOTP)
security · low: Short numeric codes derived from a shared secret plus a counter or the clock (HOTP, TOTP), or random codes sent by SMS or email; safe only with expiry, single use and attempt limits.
›
GCRA
systems · low: Generic Cell Rate Algorithm: a token bucket stored as one theoretical arrival time per key, updated with one compare-and-swap; exact limits in 8 bytes.
›
Graceful draining
systems · low: On a termination signal, stop taking new work, finish in-flight work until a deadline, tell clients to reconnect elsewhere, then exit; clients resume from a token.
›
Token bucket
systems · low: A bucket of up to b tokens refilled at rate r; requests spend tokens, enforcing an average rate while allowing bursts of b.
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Cooperative scheduling
concurrency · low: Green threads/coroutines yielding at await points on a user-space scheduler
Record replay
distributed · low: Record every nondeterministic input (time, randomness, I/O, model and tool outputs, per-tick player input) and re-execute deterministically for debugging, replays and state rebuild
PRNGs (PCG, xoshiro)
numerics · low: Small, fast, statistically strong non-cryptographic generators: PCG32 and xoshiro256**, with seeding, parallel streams and unbiased ranges.
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Leases
distributed · low: A lock that expires on its own: bounded-time ownership that survives crashes and partitions, given bounded clock drift and fencing tokens on writes.
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Write-ahead log
storage · low: Append each change to a checksummed sequential log and fsync it before touching data pages; the basis of crash durability in nearly every database.
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Health checking
systems · low: Decide per backend whether to route to it using probes and real-traffic errors, with consecutive-count hysteresis, capped ejection and a panic fallback.
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Code coverage instrumentation
compilers · low: Insert counters into compiled code to record which blocks, edges or lines ran; a spanning tree of the control-flow graph cuts the counters needed.
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Fast hash functions
data-structures · low: Non-cryptographic hashes built from 64×64→128-bit multiplies and xor-shifts; pick by key size, trust level and whether the hash is persisted.
›
Sanitizers
security · low: ASan/UBSan/TSan shadow memory and instrumentation to catch memory bugs
User agent parsing
search-sort · low: Parse user-agent strings and client hints into browser, OS and device
Fuzzy hashing
security · low: Similarity-preserving file hashes (ssdeep CTPH, TLSH) to find variants of known files
Tls fingerprinting
security · low: JA3/JA4 fingerprints of ClientHello parameters to identify clients
Trusted execution environments
security · low: Enclaves/confidential VMs with remote attestation for computing on sealed data
X509 certificates
security · low: Certificate chains, path validation, SANs, revocation and short-lived issuance
AEAD (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305)
security · low: Authenticated encryption that encrypts and detects tampering in one call; the only kind of symmetric encryption you should use.
›
Cryptographic hashes (SHA-2, BLAKE3)
security · low: Collision-resistant fingerprints of data; SHA-256 for interoperability, BLAKE3 for speed, HMAC/HKDF for keyed uses.
›
ECDH key exchange (X25519, P-256)
security · low: Each side multiplies the other's public curve point by its own scalar and both get the same point; always validate the peer key and run the result through a KDF.
›
HKDF key derivation (extract-and-ex…
security · low: HMAC-based two-step key derivation: extract a uniform pseudorandom key from any secret, then expand it into as many context-bound keys as you need.
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Object storage
cloud · low: S3-compatible blob storage at cents per GB-month with 11 nines durability; pick by egress price, request price and latency, not by storage price alone.
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Copy on write snapshots
storage · low: Point-in-time snapshots by sharing pages/extents and copying only on write
Failure bisection
search-sort · low: Binary search over commits, batches or inputs to isolate a failure
Transparent interception
networking · low: Redirect traffic to a local proxy (iptables TPROXY/REDIRECT, eBPF) without app changes
Hardware backed keystore
security · low: Non-exportable keys in Secure Enclave, StrongBox, TPM: generation, use policies, biometric gating
Secure boot chain
security · low: Each boot stage verifies the signature of the next before running it, anchored in an immutable ROM key hash, with version counters against downgrade and a TPM log of what ran.
›
Ebpf
hardware-os · low: Verified in-kernel programs on hooks (kprobes, XDP, tc) with maps
Ptrace process control
hardware-os · low: Ptrace: attach, read and write registers and memory, single-step, intercept signals
Seccomp bpf
security · low: Syscall filtering with seccomp BPF programs
fsync, O_DSYNC and O_DIRECT
hardware-os · low: What fsync, fdatasync, O_DSYNC, O_DIRECT and F_FULLFSYNC really guarantee on Linux and macOS, and the exact call sequences for crash-safe files.
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LRU and CLOCK
systems · low: LRU evicts the least recently used entry via hash map plus linked list; CLOCK approximates it with a reference bit, so hits take no lock.
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S3-FIFO
systems · low: Three FIFO queues (small, main, ghost) that evict one-hit wonders quickly and keep reused objects; low miss ratios with no list moves on hits.
›
Control-flow graph
compilers · low: Split a linear instruction list into basic blocks and connect them by jumps; the graph every optimizer, SSA builder and dataflow pass walks.
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d-ary heap
data-structures · low: Array heap with d children per node (d = 4 typical): half the binary heap's depth, siblings in one cache line, faster priority queues.
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Fencing tokens
distributed · low: A number that grows with every lock grant and is checked by the protected resource, so a paused ex-holder's late write is rejected.
›
BFS and DFS
graphs · low: The two basic graph traversals; BFS gives hop distances and levels, DFS gives discovery/finish order for cycles, components and topological order.
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Minimum spanning tree
graphs · low: Cheapest set of edges connecting all vertices; Kruskal sorts edges and joins components with union-find, Prim grows one tree, Boruvka merges in parallel rounds.
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Union-find
graphs · low: Disjoint-set forest with union by size and path compression; merges sets and answers same-set queries in effectively constant time.
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CRC32C checksums
hardware-os · low: The Castagnoli CRC-32 with dedicated instructions on x86 (SSE4.2) and ARMv8. It is the standard fast integrity check for storage blocks, logs and network frames.
›
SIMD programming
hardware-os · low: Process 4-16 lanes per instruction with AVX2, AVX-512 or NEON via Rust std::arch, with runtime dispatch and a portable fallback.
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Sparse matrices (CSR)
numerics · low: Compressed sparse row stores only nonzeros as row pointers, column indices and values; SpMV streams them once, so it is memory-bandwidth bound.
›
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